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FORMAL DECLARATIONS OF INTENDED CHILDCARE
PARENTAGE
Jeffrey A. Parness!
INTRODUCTION
Legal parentage for childcare purposes under American state law is
significantly and rapidly expanding. The new parentage norms are growing
1
increasingly imprecise. No longer is childcare parentage—that is, the
2
superior right of a parent to the “care, custody, and control” of a child —
only established by precise terms, such as distinct moments in time (i.e.,
birth), the existence of certain biological ties, a person’s status as married
to the birth mother at time of her child’s birth, the inclusion of one’s name
on a birth certificate, or formal adoption. While these forms of precise
childcare parentage establishment are still common, in increasing numbers,
both men and women can now become childcare parents where the timing
of the events establishing legal parentage is imprecise. Under such
circumstances, establishing parentage typically requires assessing a
person’s earlier parental-like acts, such as the provision of financial support
or the holding out of a child as one’s own. Intent to be a parent, and not
3
simply to be a child caretaker, is also usually key.

© 2017 Jeffrey A. Parness. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby
College; J.D., The University of Chicago. Thanks to Alex Yorko for his research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2003 (2014) (advocating, upon reviewing imprecisions in the law, for a reimagined
formalism rather than an expanded functionalism regarding parentage within nontraditional
families).
2 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting that this
parental interest “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
Court”).
3 Intent to parent, whether in precise or imprecise laws, is often not critical when, for
example, support rather than childcare parentage is at issue. Generally, child support
obligations arise for unwed biological fathers of children born of consensual sex whether or
not they have childcare opportunities. See Jason M. Merrill, Note, Falling Through the
87
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Both precise and imprecise forms of establishing childcare parentage
can now be overridden under new imprecise parentage disestablishment
norms. Whether labeled as rebuttals or rescissions of parental status under
law, parentage disestablishments today often depend on assessing the
parent-figure’s earlier conduct that occurred at no singular point in time,
like the failure of the biological father of a child born of consensual sex to
establish a bonded and dependent familial relationship with his child.
Applying establishment and disestablishment norms of childcare
parentage is often quite challenging due to the frequency of human
relocation and legal variations in childcare parentage across states. For
example, complications can arise when a child is born to a woman and
jointly raised for a while by her and another in one state, but then the birth
mother and child move to a new state. After the move, there is alleged to
be a new second childcare parent, as well as a disestablished former second
parent due to circumstances occurring at no single moment, but at times
long after birth. As one distinguished commentator observed: “The relative
importance of biology, intent, contract, and parental function varies
tremendously by jurisdiction and even by individual case, adding confusion
4
and unpredictability to a determination of critical importance.”
Judicial inquiries into imprecise childcare parentage in both
establishment and disestablishment settings would be greatly facilitated if
American state lawmakers created new mechanisms for formal expressions
of earlier and current parental and parental-like intentions. As intent to
parent often is quite relevant in such inquiries, these new mechanisms
should facilitate determinations of imprecise childcare parentage. Part I of
this Essay first reviews current state imprecise childcare parentage laws
and then considers the importance of parental intentions in such laws. Part
II suggests new mechanisms for formal declarations of intended childcare
parentage. Such declarations would not necessarily determine childcare
parentage under law. Still, they would be quite helpful when courts assess
earlier actions when determining imprecise childcare parentage issues.
I. IMPRECISE CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS
Imprecise childcare parentage laws can lead to surprising, if not
shocking, parental childcare interests. In one case, childcare parentage was
possible for a couple who cared for a child for ten years, after the birth

Cracks: Distinguishing Parental Rights From Parental Obligations in Cases Involving
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship, 11 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 203 (2008).
4 Joanna L. Grossman, Family Law’s Loose Canon, 93 TEX. L. REV. 681, 703 (2015)
(reviewing JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED (2014)).
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mother left the one-year-old with the couple, then strangers, at a gas station
5
after a few minutes of conversation.
Numerous factors contribute to the surprises caused when applying
imprecise nature of childcare parentage laws. These include variances in
terminology, differing standards for the same situation in different states,
differing parentage standards in different contexts within the same state,
inconsistent disestablishment norms both inter- and intrastate, and choice
of law complications in assessing childcare parentage. This Part explores
each of these factors in turn, and then examines the import of parental
intentions to imprecise childcare parentage.
A. Common Elements of Childcare Parentage Establishment
A preliminary challenge with childcare parentage laws is that they
utilize varying titles, including de facto parenthood, presumed parent,
6
equitable adoption, and parentage by estoppel. In a single state, two or
more appellations might be used to cover differing forms of imprecise
7
Sometimes, the same appellation has different
childcare parentage.
8
Further, imprecise childcare parentage
meanings in different states.
appellations do not always mean what they appear to mean. For example, a
woman married to a birth mother is sometimes eligible to become a
9
presumed childcare “father.” Finally, a person’s imprecise parentage
establishment can sometimes follow the rebuttal of that person’s precise
parentage establishment, such as when a child’s mother’s former husband
loses his marital paternity presumption due to lack of biological ties, but

5 In re M.M.G., 287 P.3d 952, 953–54 (Mont. 2012) (remanding to determine
possible parentage for the couple).
6 For a comprehensive survey of such laws, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law
(R)Evolution: The Key Questions, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 752–63 (2013).
7 Consider the imprecise childcare parentage laws in Delaware, where there is a “de
facto” parent, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(3) (West 2016) (de facto parentage where
one acts in a “parental role”), and a “presumed parent,” id. § 8-204(a)(5) (establishing
presumed parentage where one “held out the child as [one’s] own”).
8 Consider de facto parent status. In Delaware, there is childcare parentage for a de
facto parent, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c), while in the District of Colombia one can
seek “third party” custody as a “de facto parent,” D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01, 831.03.
9 See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 160.106, 160.201(b), 160.204(a) (West 2015) (providing
that paternity provisions, as with the law establishing presumed paternity for a man holding
out a child as one’s own, apply to maternity determinations); see also In re Guardianship of
Madelyn B., 98 A.3d 494, 502 (N.H. 2014) (holding that presumed “father” statute applied
equally to a man or a woman); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283, 287–88 (N.M. 2012)
(holding that former lesbian partner of an adoptive mother can be a presumed natural parent
under a statute on presuming a “man . . . to be the natural father of a child” (quoting
Uniform Parentage Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5(A)(4) (1986), repealed by New Mexico
Uniform Parentage Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11A-101 to -903 (2010)).
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receives imprecise parentage establishment under the equitable parent
10
doctrine.
Many imprecise childcare parentage establishment laws—both
statutory and common law—demand that a person reside with the child as a
prerequisite to parentage. While some laws set out a minimum period of
11
12
residency, others do not. These laws frequently lead to recognition of a
second parent on equal footing with the child’s custodial biological or
13
adoptive parent.
A second common requisite for establishing imprecise childcare
parentage requires that the person provided prior financial support to the
child.
While some laws require significant support and specify
14
15
requirements, others do not.
Yet another common element involves whether the alleged new
childcare parent previously held himself out in the community as a parent.
Some laws specifically require a person to hold out the child as his or her
16
own on the basis of natural or biological bonds. Others, though, are less
17
precise, and simply require that the child be held out as the person’s own.

10 See, e.g., Vanderark v. Vanderark, No. 291216, 2009 WL 2448293 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2009) (per curiam) (overcoming, seemingly, husband’s presumed paternity, a
doctrine recognized in Barnes v. Jeudevine, 718 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Mich. 2006)).
11 See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v) (West 2016) (requiring that a
presumed parent resides “in the same household” for first two years of child’s life).
12 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1)(d) (West 2015) (presuming natural
fatherhood for man who “receives the child” into his home “while the child is under the age
of majority”).
13 See, e.g., Morgan v. Weiser, 923 A.2d 1183, 1187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (stating
that once established, rights and liabilities arising from in loco parentis relationship are the
same as those arising from biological or formal adoptive parenthood); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-201(c), 8-203 (West 2016) (mandating that de facto parentage establishes
a parent-child relationship on par with the parent-child relationship of a birth or formal
adoptive parent).
14 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (West 2016) (presuming parentage where
person established “a significant parental relationship with the child by providing emotional
and financial support for the child”).
15 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(5) (West 2016) (presuming parentage may
be founded, in part, for one who “provides support for the child”).
16 See id. (stating that a presumed parent holds out child as a “natural child”); see also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55(d) (West 2016) (defining presumed parent as one who “holds
out the child as his biological child”).
17 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (West 2016) (deeming one a presumed
parent if he “openly held out the child as his own”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-504(a)(v)
(West 2016) (deeming one a presumed parent if he “openly held out the child as his own”).
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B. Contextual Challenges to Parentage Establishment Intrastate
Even within a single state, imprecise childcare parentage laws pose
challenges because there are sometimes wide variations in the definition of
“parentage” across contexts. Parentage for childcare purposes often differs
from parentage in other settings. Some parentage establishment laws in
probate settings recognize parentage when there is a subjective intent to
adopt, while such intent is insufficient to establish parentage in childcare
18
Further, parentage can differ between childcare and child
settings.
support settings. For example, state laws usually deem biological fathers
financially responsible for their children born to unwed mothers; yet, these
same fathers are often not entitled to seek childcare orders since their
parental childcare opportunities have been initially seized, or their seized
childcare opportunity has not yielded continuing childcare worthy of
19
parental status.
A Florida case in May 2006 recognized intrastate legal parentage
20
In the case, an unwed biological
variations dependent upon context.
father claimed parentage in an adoption proceeding.
There was
inconsistency between the Florida statutes on formal adoptions—especially
the provisions on putative father registry filings, which entitled only those
unwed biological fathers who registered to notice of, and participation in,
later adoption proceedings—and the provisions on child support paternity
lawsuits involving unwed biological fathers, which allowed money orders
21
founded solely on biological ties. The court observed:
This case demonstrates that Florida has taken substantially different
statutory approaches to the rights and responsibilities of biological
fathers of children born to unmarried mothers depending upon the issue
at stake. In cases of adoption, we wish to minimize unmarried

18 Compare Greenfield v. Daniels, 51 So. 3d 421, 429 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the
deceased biological father did need to acknowledge responsibility in order to be obligated to
provide child support), and DeHart v. DeHart 986 N.E.2d 85, 104 (Ill. 2013) (stating that
“objective evidence of an intent to adopt” by decedent can prompt recognition of an
equitable adoption in a probate setting; no recognition if evidence only shows a person (like
a foster parent or stepparent) treats a child “lovingly and on an equal basis with his or her
natural or legally adopted children”), with C.G. v. J.R., 130 So. 3d 776, 780–81 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that child did not have survivor’s claim, regardless of recognition,
related to deceased biological father where child had been born into an intact marriage that
closed off biological father’s childcare interests), and In re Scarlett Z.-D., 428 N.E.3d 776,
792 (Ill. 2015) (holding that subjective intent to adopt that is employed for equitable
adoption in probate setting does not apply to “proceedings for parentage, custody, and
visitation”).
19 See, e.g., In re C.N., 839 N.W.2d 841, 844–45 (N.D. 2013); see also In re
Adoption of Baby A., 944 So. 2d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
20 In re Adoption of Baby A., 944 So.2d 380.
21 Id. at 389–91.
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biological fathers’ rights. When the state seeks to declare a child
dependent, the unmarried biological father’s rights are guarded in the
hopes the father will fulfill his parental obligations to the child. In cases
of child support, especially when the state seeks reimbursement of
welfare payments, we attempt to maximize the unmarried biological
father’s responsibilities. Whether Florida needs a unified policy for the
rights of such biological fathers or whether varying policies can coexist
is an interesting issue that is raised, but certainly not resolved, in this
22
case.

As the Florida court suggests, intrastate contextual variations in legal
parentage can be reasonable. For example, some biological fathers should
have no participation rights in any formal adoption proceedings involving
their offspring, but nevertheless should be held accountable for child
support for those same offspring should there be no formal adoption.
Sensibly, child abandonment ends paternal adoption notice interests, but
not paternal financial support duties.
Similarly, some biological fathers may have no custody or visitation
rights with their children who reside with their birth mothers, but
nevertheless will be held responsible for child support. On such variations,
the Sixth Circuit in N.E. v. Hedges observed:
[T]here are no judicial decisions recognizing a constitutional right of a
man to terminate his duties of support under state law for a child that he
has fathered, no matter how removed he may be emotionally from the
child. Child support has long been a tax fathers have had to pay in
Western civilization. For reasons of child welfare and social utility, if
not for moral reasons, the biological relationship between a father and
his offspring—even if unwanted and unacknowledged—remains
constitutionally sufficient to support paternity tests and child support
requirements. We do not have a system of government like ancient
Sparta where male children are taken over early in their lives by the
state for military service. The biological parents remain responsible for
their welfare. One of the ways the state enforces this duty is through
paternity laws. This responsibility is not growing weaker in our body
23
politic . . . but stronger.

Other intrastate variations in legal parentage are less reasonable. In
Iowa, for example, a man is a father “for certain purposes” due to a marital
paternity presumption, requiring childcare opportunities and child support
responsibilities, but is not a “parent” who is a necessary party when his
child is subject to a statutory proceeding involving a child in need of
22 Id. at 395 n.21. The court’s Baby A. ruling was disapproved by Heart of
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 203 (Fla. 2007), but not the quoted language.
23 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); accord Ex parte M.D.C., 39 So. 3d 1117, 1133
(Ala. 2009). See generally In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 745 n.4 (Iowa 2011); Merrill, supra
note 3.
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24

assistance. And in Mississippi, a child, per the in loco parentis doctrine,
cannot recover on a parent’s death under the wrongful death statute, but can
25
recover under the workers’ compensation statute. Whether reasonable or
not, these examples illustrate the importance of context in many American
states’ childcare parentage laws.
C. Disestablishment of Childcare Parentage Intrastate and Interstate
Whether established at precise or imprecise moments, childcare
parentage can be rebutted, rescinded, or otherwise overridden under the
law. As with parentage establishment, there are imprecise parentage
disestablishment standards that vary not only intrastate in differing
contexts, but also interstate within the same context.
Two common forms of precise childcare parentage are a voluntary
parentage acknowledgment (VAP) and a marital parentage presumption.
Each form designates one a parent under law at a precise point in time: a
VAP usually does so at the moment of execution or filing, and the marital
parentage presumption typically recognizes parentage in a person at the
moment his or her spouse becomes pregnant, is pregnant, or gives birth.
Both VAP and marital parentage presumption usually contemplate the
possibility of biological ties between a child and a newly recognized parent
who is not the birth mother.
Standards for challenging or rescinding a VAP differ intrastate from
those for rebutting a marital presumption. While establishment of both of
these forms of childcare parentage occurs at a precise time, their respective
disestablishment standards sometimes depend upon conduct occurring at no
precise point in time. VAP disestablishment norms are driven, in large
part, by federal statutes. Federal laws generously allow rescissions by VAP
signatories within sixty days of signing; but federal laws bar VAP
challenges after sixty days by signatories in the absence of fraud, duress, or
26
By contrast, rebuttal norms for marital
material mistake of fact.
parentage presumptions favoring the spouses of birth mothers are left
27
entirely to state lawmakers, regardless of when challenges are presented.
In re J.C., 857 N.W.2d 495, 501, 505 (Iowa 2014).
Estate of Smith v. Smith, 130 So. 3d 508, 512–15 (Miss. 2014) (en banc)
(differentiating disparate results due to the express language in the two statutes).
26 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2012). States participating in certain federal
welfare programs are required to adhere to § 666. 42 U.S.C. § 654(20). The federal statutes
are described in Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity:
Should Biology Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV.
479, 486–88 (2005). The state rescission statutes are listed and described in Paula Roberts,
Truth and Consequences: Part III. Who Pays When Paternity is Disestablished?, 37 FAM.
L.Q. 69, 82–90 (2003).
27 Broad state lawmaking, within federal constitutional limits of course, was
recognized in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (plurality opinion), and
24
25
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Within a single state, there are different imprecise disestablishment
norms relevant to VAPs and to marital parentage presumptions. Thus in
Louisiana, as in other states, VAPs may be contested by male signatories
28
after sixty days if there is shown fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,
circumstances often not occurring at a precise moment in time. But in
Louisiana, though not in all other states, a husband may seek a disavowal
29
of a marital paternity presumption more than one year after birth if he acts
within “one year” of “the day the husband knew or should have known that
he may not be the biological father of the child,” again a circumstance that
30
In California, as well,
need not occur at a precise moment in time.
different imprecise parentage disestablishment norms operate for VAPs and
31
for marital parentage presumptions.
As to childcare parentage disestablishment norms interstate, consider
again VAPs. Notwithstanding the aforementioned federal statutory norms,
there are significant interstate variations in VAP parentage

confirmed when the very California marital parentage presumption laws affirmed in
Michael H. were later amended via CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West 2016). Compare 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/8(a)(3) (1984) (repealed 2015) (stating marital paternity
presumption may be disestablished by presumed father-husband within two years after he
obtained “knowledge of relevant facts”), and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/205(b) (West
2016) (using similar language to original statute: “knew or should have known of the
relevant facts”), with In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 511 (Ill. 2004) (stating
that standards on biological father’s opportunity to disestablish husband’s presumed marital
parentage and to establish his own paternity under Illinois law are unclear, and involve
“public policy” issues better addressed by the General Assembly). See generally Roberts,
supra note 26, app. at 94–95 (state marital paternity presumption rebuttal statutes are listed
and described).
28 LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:406(B)(1) (2016) (indicating a male signatory can revoke after
sixty days by showing that he “is not the biological parent of the child,” an opportunity
contrary to federal law mandates for states participating in the federal (Title IV-D) welfare
subsidy program, 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D) (ii)–(iii), and rendering superfluous the statutory
fraud, duress, and mistake conditions for VAP contests); see also Rousseve v. Jones, 704
So. 2d 229, 233 (La. 1997) (stating that when acknowledgment of biological ties between
man and child is “ultimately untrue, the acknowledgment may be null, absent some
overriding concern of public policy”). This approach is not employed to disavowals of
marital paternity presumptions as only there are children legitimated. See e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (West 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-831.01, 831.03 (West 2016).
29 Though not for “a child born to his wife as a result of an assisted conception to
which he consented.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (2016).
30 Id. art. 189.
31 Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(e) (West 2016) (stating that male VAP signor, a
presumed parent per § 7611, may only have the VAP set aside if it is deemed in “the best
interest[] of the child”), with id. § 7541 (stating that notwithstanding marital paternity
presumption, within two years of birth, a husband can seek blood tests; where husband is
found not to be the biological father, “the question of paternity of the husband shall be
resolved accordingly”).
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32

disestablishment guidelines. These differing disestablishment guidelines
include both precise and imprecise norms. Precise statutory norms speak to
33
matters like the time limits on VAP challenges and who may challenge.
Imprecise norms speak to matters like estoppel, barring VAP challenges
due to earlier post-signing conduct that occurred at no precise point in
34
time.
There are also significant interstate variations in the standards for
rebutting a marital parentage presumption.
To establish such a
presumption, state parentage laws are generally quite precise, with
parentage dependent upon satisfying specific conditions at certain moments
in time. There are differences in the relevant conditions or moments in
time across states. For example, concerning the timing of the marriage,
35
some state laws look at marriage at the time of birth or conception while
36
others look only to marriage at the time of birth. As to the rebuttal of
such a presumption, again there can be precise laws, such as those barring a
37
rebuttal after a certain period of time after birth. But there can also be
imprecise marital parentage rebuttal norms.
In some states there can be no rebuttal of a marital parentage
presumption by anyone outside the marriage so long as the married couple
is “committed to remaining married” and to raising “the child as issue of

32 Incidentally, there are sometimes also significant variations in the precedents in a
single state, especially where the statutes on acknowledgement are unclear. See, e.g., Kelly
M. Greco & Stephanie R. Hammer, Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity,
102 ILL. B.J. 432, 452 (2014) (pointing to “[u]ncertainty in Illinois law”).
33 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(1) (West 2016) (“a signatory of an
acknowledgment”), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1011(1) (repealed 2012) (mother,
signing man, child, or prosecuting attorney), and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-307(1) (West
2016) (“signatory” or “a support-enforcement agency”), with ALA. CODE 26-17-609(b)
(2016) (“If a child has an acknowledged father, an individual, who is not a signatory to the
acknowledgment of paternity and who seeks an adjudication of paternity of the child may
maintain a proceeding at any time after the effective date of the acknowledgment if the court
determines that it is in the best interest of the child.”).
34 See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/610(a) (West 2016) (inequity and “child’s best
interests”); N.Y. FAM. CT. LAW § 516-a(b) (McKinney 2016) (after sixty days, equitable
estoppel can operate); Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 87
(2010) (surveying rescission requirements in several states); Cacioppo, supra note 26, at
494–99 (reviewing VAP challenge cases).
35 Compare 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)(1) (1984) (repealed 2015) (“born or
conceived”), with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/204(a)(1) (West 2016) (“born”). See also
ME. R. EVID. 302 (West 2016) (“born” or “conceived”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.41(1)(a)
(West 2015) (“conceived or born”).
36 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (West 2016) (“child is born during the marriage”).
37 See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 26, app. at 94–95 (reviewing state statutes).
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the marriage,” circumstances often not occurring at precise moments.
Elsewhere, rebuttals of a marital parentage presumption can be pursued by
only certain biological fathers via an action to establish a parent-child
relationship, with such fathers distinguished statutorily by their earlier acts
39
like “abandonment” or
occurring at no precise point in time,
40
And as to a husband’s rebuttal, it can sometimes be
“desertion.”
foreclosed via the common law doctrine of paternity by estoppel as long as
the child’s best interests are served, again a circumstance occurring at no
41
precise time.
D. Choice of Parentage Laws
Finally, when imprecise parentage law disputes involve conduct in
two or more states (or two or more countries), the significant interstate (and
international) variations in parentage establishment and disestablishment
norms within a single context can lead to difficult choice of law issues.
The need to choose among competing laws (such as where there are “true
conflicts”) too often goes unrecognized, resulting in some odd rulings.
The extreme case of Johnson v. Johnson, resolved by the North
42
Dakota Supreme Court in 2000, illustrates one such ruling. There,
Antonyio Johnson first sought to divorce Madonna Johnson in North
Dakota in July 1998. Madonna sought child support for her granddaughter,
Jessica, who Madonna urged had been equitably adopted by Antonyio
43
under North Dakota law.
The Johnsons were married in September 1986, with no child ever
born to Madonna during the marriage. But in August 1988, the Johnsons,
then living in New Jersey, took custody of Jessica, then three months old

38 R.P. v. K.S.W., 320 P.3d 1084, 1093, 1099 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (interpreting
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607(1) (West 2016) and assuming “no constitutional
challenge”); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(b), (2) (West 2016); Strauser v.
Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999).
39 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/608(a) (West 2016) (allowing two years to
file from time petitioner “knew or should have known of the relevant facts”). The
circumstances allowing such an establishment remain, however, unclear. See 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/610(a)(2)–(3) (West 2016) (stating it to be inequitable to disestablish
husband as presumed parent; in child’s best interest not to allow establishment).
40 See, e.g., In re Waites, 152 So. 3d 306, 314 (Miss. 2014) (en banc) (holding that for
child born of adultery to wife during marriage, biological father can seek custody as long as
there is “no clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral conduct
detrimental to the child, and/or unfitness” and husband may not seek custody if there is no
such evidence though he has “standing in loco parentis,” which allows him to seek third
party visitation (quoting Davis v. Vaughn, 126 So. 3d 33, 37 (Miss. 2013))).
41 See, e.g., K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798 (Pa. 2012).
42 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000).
43 Id. at 101.
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and the natural granddaughter of Madonna, in Pennsylvania.
While
Jessica was scheduled to remain with the Johnsons for only a month, ten
years later, at the time of the North Dakota divorce, Jessica was still with
45
the Johnsons. During that decade, Jessica was raised as the Johnsons’
child. The Johnsons had initiated formal adoption proceedings in New
Jersey and Kentucky—where Jessica’s natural parents lived—but neither of
those proceedings were completed due to the Johnsons’ military work
46
transfers. From August 1988 to May 1997 the Johnsons resided in New
Jersey and Florida, with Antonyio sometimes deployed overseas. Antonyio
47
was sent to Grand Forks, North Dakota, in May 1998. By then, Antonyio
and Madonna were not living together. Madonna and Jessica therefore
never lived in North Dakota.
The North Dakota Supreme Court looked to cases on “contract to
48
It determined that the
adopt” only in the context of inheritance law.
public policy of the state supported application of the doctrine of equitable
adoption “to impose a child support obligation under certain
49
The
circumstances” and that nothing in North Dakota law forbade it.
court remanded for resolution of factual issues involving the application of
50
the North Dakota equitable adoption doctrine to Antonyio.
A dissenting justice began: “This is a case of a grandmother and her
51
grandchild who have never lived in North Dakota.” He went on: “[I]t is
clear that if an ‘equitable adoption’ took place, it took place in New Jersey
or Kentucky and would therefore be governed by the law of one of those
52
states.” In both New Jersey and Kentucky there is no equitable adoption
53
doctrine. New Jersey or Kentucky law was deemed appropriate by the
54
dissent under North Dakota choice of law rules for contract cases.
The majority did not respond to these observations. Unfortunately, no
opinion in Johnson considered utilizing an interest analysis to determine
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 109. Such an application of the equitable adoption doctrine, however, was
“limited” as the court expressed “preference for adherence to statutory procedures” on
formal adoptions. Id. at 106 n.3.
50 Id. at 109–10.
51 Id. at 112 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 123 (“[I]t objectively appears that our precedent would mandate the
application of another forum’s law because the alleged contract arose in either Kentucky or
New Jersey and was performed in either of those states, the subject matter was in either of
those states, and the domicile of all parties was in either of those states at the time the
alleged contract was made.”).
44
45
46
47
48
49

98

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 92

which state’s imprecise parentage law on equitable adoption in the child
support context might operate. And no opinion considered whether to
decline jurisdiction altogether, or at least over the parentage, if not the child
55
Further, no opinion addressed any
support, issue as to Antonyio.
difference between Antonyio’s legal parenthood in child support and
childcare settings.
E. The Importance of Parental Intentions to Imprecise Parentage
In the childcare context—as well as others, like child support—
imprecise American state parentage establishment and disestablishment
laws frequently require courts to look back in time to assess both an alleged
new legal parent’s and an existing legal parent’s earlier intentions
regarding the alleged new parent’s future relationship with the existing
parent’s child. In looking back, courts do not focus on a precise point in
time as they often do with VAPs or marital parentage presumptions.
Accordingly, formal declarations of such intentions would greatly assist the
courts in looking back at past events. Such declarations could or could not
56
be registered with the state and should involve processes assuring the
declarations were likely truthful when made. Before further exploring how
such declarations might be made, this Section briefly reviews the roles
played by such intentions in imprecise childcare parentage laws.
Imprecise childcare parentage laws can directly or indirectly speak to
an existing parent’s intentions regarding a nonparent who may one day
become a parent. Direct speech is exemplified by a Delaware statute that
says that a de facto parent can only be recognized where a parental-like
relationship developed between a child and a nonparent with the “support
57
Indirect speech on a legal parent’s
and consent” of a legal parent.
intent—that is, a statute implying there needs to be parental intent without
expressly saying so—is exemplified by a New Jersey statute that declares
there can be “presumed” childcare parentage for a nonparent who earlier
openly held out the child as his natural child and provided support for the
58
child, actions that are likely known and sanctioned by a legal parent.

55 See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-14.1-18 (West 2016) (stating that trial court may
decline to exercise its child custody jurisdiction if it provides an “inconvenient forum,”
measured, for example, by the nature and location of any evidence, the length of time the
child resided outside North Dakota, and the financial resources of the parties).
56 Unregistered formal declarations of intent that are later utilized include wills, while
registered formal declarations of intent that are later utilized include certifications on
putative father registries for adoption notice purposes.
57 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (West 2016).
58 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4)–(5) (West 2016) (indicating no need for a
legal parent’s knowledge or agreement, where the nonparent attains equal footing with the
legal parent per N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40).
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Comparably, imprecise childcare parentage laws can also speak
directly or indirectly to a nonparent’s intentions regarding the development
of a new or continuing parental-like relationship with a child. Speaking
directly, some state presumed childcare parentage laws require that the
59
nonparent hold out the child as his or her own “natural child.” Speaking
indirectly, and thus not expressly demanding parental intentions, some
states’ imprecise childcare parentage laws require that the nonparent
provided financial assistance to the child while holding out the child as
one’s own, but require no actions indicating any belief as to biological ties,
which more clearly suggest one’s consciousness of possible legal
60
parentage.
Incidentally, some intent from an existing legal parent regarding a
potential new legal parent seems constitutionally required.
It is
fundamentally unfair, for example, for an existing parent to now have to
share—and battle for—custody, visitation, parental responsibility
allocations, and the like with another who had neither actual or presumed
biological ties, nor formal adoptive ties to the child, where the legal parent
did nothing to encourage the parental-like acts of the other and, in fact,
61
Likewise, it is
intended always to remain a single parent under law.
fundamentally unfair for a one-time nonparent to be saddled with future
child support obligations, perhaps accompanying new childcare
opportunities as a new legal parent, where the nonparent never did, or
never will, pursue childcare interests in court and, in fact, always intended
not to develop a parental-like relationship with, nor to provide support for,
62
the child.
II.

FACILITATING FORMAL DECLARATIONS OF ASSUMED OR INTENDED
PARENTAL CHILDCARE

Courts often recognize the importance of express written declarations
of assumed or intended childcare parentage. Wills sometimes indicate
assumed childcare parentage by decedents for purposes of property
disposition upon death. Putative father registries indicate intended future
childcare parentage for purposes of later adoption proceedings. Written
declarations of current or future childcare are only produced in court when
there is a need to examine an alleged current or future parent-child
relationship. Earlier declarations of assumed childcare, or of future

59 See id. § 9:17-43(a); see also ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (2016) (nonparent
holding out that there are “natural” ties can establish parentage).
60 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (West 2016); see also Jeffrey A. Parness,
Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent Laws, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 811, 830 (2014)
(describing similar state laws).
61 See, e.g., Parness, supra note 60, at 811.
62 Id. at 842–45.
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parental childcare intentions, could be used, to assist later courts in
imprecise parental childcare settings. As this Part shows, the guidelines on
wills and putative father registries provide much aid for those
contemplating new laws on the employment of declarations of assumed and
intended parental-like acts in later imprecise childcare parentage disputes.
A. Wills
Illinois law illustrates how earlier formal declarations of assumed
childcare parentage involving those now deceased are employed in
property dispositions during probate. One law recognizes a duty in one
“named as executor of the will of a deceased person” to “institute a
63
proceeding,” usually geared to having “the will admitted to probate.”
Within six months after the admission, “any interested person may file a
64
Only then will a
petition . . . to contest the validity of the will.”
determination of imprecise childcare parentage formally declared in the
65
will be made. Comparably, when there is no will, a probate court will
explore parentage in the decedent relevant to intestacy laws, where legal
parentage is often determined for the first time based upon the decedent’s
earlier informal declarations on parenthood, such as through oral
statements indicating promises or intentions to adopt, as well as formal
66
declarations of parenthood, like private written acknowledgments.
B. Putative Father Registries
Comparably, earlier formal declarations of intended childcare via
putative father registries by alleged biological fathers, who are not then
presumed, adjudicated, or acknowledged fathers (usually of children born
of consensual sex), are employed in later adoption proceedings (often
initiated by the post-birth husbands of the birth mothers, by prospective

63 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/6-3(a) (West 2016) (stating that the proceeding may
also involve a named executor declaring a “refusal to act as executor”).
64 Id. 5/8-1(a).
65 See, e.g., id. 5/2-4(c) (“For purposes of inheritance from the child . . . a child is
adopted when the child . . . is declared or assumed to be the adopted child of the testator or
grantor in any instrument bequeathing or giving property to the child.”).
66 See, e.g., DeHart v. DeHart, 986 N.E.2d 85, 93, 104–05 (Ill. 2013) (recognizing a
nonmarital child who was never formally adopted by the decedent could nevertheless be
“the natural object” of the decedent’s bounty via the common law doctrine of equitable
adoption); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(b)(iii) (West 2016) (stating that a
“man is considered to be the child’s natural father for purposes of intestate successions” if
the “man and the child have established a mutually acknowledged relationship of parent and
child that begins before the child becomes age 18 and continues until terminated by the
death of either”).
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67

adopting persons, or by couples after birth mothers relinquish custody).
Such formal declarations usually can be filed before birth, but sometimes
68
must be filed no later than very shortly after birth (fifteen to thirty days).
Frequently, they must precede the filing of an adoption petition or a
69
petition for termination of parental rights.
C. Formal Declarations of Assumed or Intended Parental Childcare
Formal declarations of earlier assumed parental childcare appear in
wills where such declarations may or may not be persuasive in later probate
proceedings. Formal declarations of earlier intended parental childcare
appear in putative father registries where such declarations may or may not
be persuasive in later adoption or parental rights termination proceedings.
Comparably, formal declarations of assumed or intended parental childcare
could be persuasive in later imprecise childcare parentage proceedings.
New laws on assumed or intended parental childcare declarations in
imprecise parentage proceedings can be modeled on the California laws
allowing, but not requiring, the use of General Assembly forms on intended
parentage in later parentage disputes involving children “conceived through
assisted reproduction” not involving “agreements for gestational carriers or
70
There, the optional forms reflect the statutory
surrogacy agreements.”
“writing requirement” on parentage in varied assisted reproduction
71
Credibility is enhanced as the forms demand notarized
settings.
signatures and recognize the potential penalty of perjury. Like wills, and
unlike putative father registrations, the California forms are not filed with
the government at the time of execution.
As in California, other state legislatures or agencies could develop
forms in and outside of assisted reproduction that reflect their own state’s
imprecise childcare parentage norms operating in both the parentage
establishment and disestablishment settings. One or more persons could

67 Putative father registry laws are well reviewed in Mary Beck, A National Putative
Father Registry, 36 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 295 (2007) (supporting a national registry
established by Congress), which is accompanied by Lindsay Biesterfeld, Appendix, Survey
of Putative Father Registries by State, 36 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 339 (2007).
68 Biesterfeld, supra note 67, at 339–61 (thirty days after birth in Delaware, Illinois,
Ohio, and Minnesota; fifteen days after birth in Missouri; ten days after birth in New
Mexico; and seventy-two hours after birth in Montana).
69 Id. (prior to adoption petition in Arkansas and Indiana and prior to petition for
termination of parental rights in Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, and Massachusetts).
70 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5(a), (c) (West 2016) (stating that use of form does “not
preclude a court from considering any other claims to parentage under California statute or
case law”).
71 Id. § 7613.5(d) (referencing § 7613).
Available forms include assisted
reproduction undertaken by two married or unmarried people, where the signatories may or
may not have used their own sperm or eggs to conceive a child.
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sign the optional forms. A biological father of a child born of sex could
declare that he has no intent to childcare. A birth mother could declare her
acquiescence in her new partner assuming a parental-like role. Both a birth
mother and her soon-to-be spouse could declare their intentions to raise her
child jointly upon marriage.
Credibility should be promoted, as in California, by dictates on notary
acknowledgments, warnings of possible perjury charges, and
encouragements of attorney consultations. Informed declarations should
also be promoted by including within the forms the legal requisites—set
forth in plain language—and citations to relevant statutes, regulations, and
judicial precedents. State governments could give parties the choice to file
their forms with the relevant governmental department at the time of
execution.
Singular signature intended childcare parentage forms could include
reformulated prebirth putative father registrations, which would be deemed
directly relevant by statute outside of adoption-parental rights termination
72
proceedings. These earlier registrations indicating a desire to undertake
childcare of any future child could be employed in a later paternity
proceeding involving an alleged or actual unwed biological father seeking a
childcare order involving an existing child over the birth mother’s
objection. Comparably, earlier prebirth registrations by alleged or actual
biological fathers indicating desires not to undertake childcare of any laterborn children could be employed in any later proceeding involving
attempts by those fathers to establish their own de facto parentage. Prebirth
declarations as to future childcare intentions would help courts determine
whether unwed biological fathers have federal constitutional childcare
interests since those interests typically only arise if the fathers formed a

72 Putative father registries are now chiefly used in adoption proceedings to determine
whether unwed biological fathers must be noticed about, and given chances to participate in,
adoption proceedings involving their children born of consensual sex to unwed mothers who
may (i.e., stepfather adoption) or may not continue as childcare parents. See, e.g., Mary
Beck, Toward A National Putative Father Registry Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
1031, 1033 (2002) (reviewing American state laws and arguing “for a national putative
father registry database,” in part, because paternity efforts can now be thwarted by interstate
travel); Karen Greenberg et al., A National Responsible Father Registry: Providing
Constitutional Protections for Children, Mothers and Fathers, 13 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 85, 86 (2014) (same). Putative father registries outside of adoption or parental
rights termination can be deemed pertinent, for example, in de facto childcare parent
settings where intentions to assume legal parenthood are relevant, if not dispositive. But see
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(g) (“A person’s offer or refusal to sign a voluntary declaration of
paternity may be considered as a factor, but shall not be determinative, as to the issue of
legal parentage in any proceedings regarding the establishment or termination of parental
rights.”).
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“significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship” with the
73
children.
Singular signature intended childcare parentage forms could also
include paternity acknowledgments, like those recommended within the
74
1973 (though not the 2000) Uniform Parentage Act. There, a man is a
presumed natural father if he acknowledges paternity in writing within the
state and the birth mother “does not dispute” the acknowledgment in a
writing filed with the state “within a reasonable time after being
75
informed.”
Multiple signature forms indicating earlier assumed and continuing, or
newly intended, childcare parentage can include premarital or midmarriage declarations addressing current and/or intended parental-like
childcare by a prospective or current stepparent of a child who is in the sole
custody of the one parent then recognized under law. In 2012, the Uniform
State Law Commissioners recognized that such declarations, while not
contracts that bind courts, should “guide” courts making childcare
76
decisions.
Multiple signature forms containing declarations of intended childcare
parentage might be registered with the state at the time of execution, unlike
premarital or mid-marriage pacts containing similar declarations. Consider
domestic partnership registrations, which could include not only intentions
regarding future property distribution, but also intentions that will guide
77
courts during future childcare disputes.
State statutes (or enabling regulations) recognizing the import of
earlier formal declarations of assumed or intended parental childcare in
imprecise childcare parentage settings, via discretionary forms available for

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
Id. § 4(a)(5). The recommendation has not been widely adopted. But see 15 R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-8-3(a)(4) (West 2016) (providing that man is a “presumed to be the
natural father” via such an acknowledgement).
76 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Prenups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 343 (2015) (reviewing the recommendation while demonstrating how such agreements
could guide judges hearing childcare, child support, and child creation disputes).
77 To date, domestic partnership registration laws have addressed property and
inheritance rights, but have not contemplated childcare declarations. See, e.g., ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710(6)(c) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.07.400(2)(b) (West
2016). But see Gardenour v. Bondelle, 60 N.E.3d 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (child born of
consensual assisted reproduction into a same-sex registered domestic partnership has two
childcare parents, per precedents, with non-birth mother also a childcare parent due to
marital parentage presumption). For a more expansive view of possible family formation
registrations—including cohabitation arrangements between those with no sexual
relationships, including siblings; older children and their parents; and best friends, see
generally Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Family Formation and the Home,
104 KY. L.J. 449 (2016).
73
74
75
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use during later judicial assessments in childcare disputes, could follow—
and be modeled on—earlier, instate common-law precedents. Such
precedents, for example, would have addressed the role of childcare
agreements between parents and nonparents, or of singular
acknowledgments of the parental-like intentions of nonparents. Where
forms are utilized, factual disputes as to earlier childcare intentions—as in
78
As
assisted reproduction settings—can be more easily resolved.
imprecise childcare parentage norms differ widely interstate, lawmakers—
perhaps guided by the earlier works of in-state lawyers in drafting parental
childcare pacts in marriage dissolution, premarital agreement, and assisted
reproduction settings—must become familiar with their own state’s
imprecise childcare parentage norms.
CONCLUSION
The fluidity of imprecise childcare parentage laws in American states,
together with the significant intrastate and interstate variations in these
laws, presents significant challenges to courts. The same appellation, like
“equitable adoption” or “de facto parent,” can have different meanings
intrastate and interstate.
Women can be presumed legal fathers.
Stepparents and grandparents can morph into fathers and mothers without
formal adoptions due to earlier parental-like actions, which did not occur at
precise moments in time.
Imprecise American state childcare parentage establishment and
disestablishment laws increasingly require courts to look back in time to
assess parental-like conduct. This retrospective inquiry is often quite
difficult, as the parties at that point are frequently emotional, or motivated
to interpret the same conduct differently, if not to fabricate. Such
retrospective inquiry is also often difficult when an existing single
custodial parent dies.
Courts would be aided in their inquiries into earlier parental-like acts
in imprecise parentage childcare cases if clear indications of childcare
intentions were earlier expressed by existing legal parents and by those
looking forward to (further) pursuing a parental role. Voluntary paternity
acknowledgements do not now, and should not ever, cover such
expressions. They were meant, and should remain, for alleged biological
fathers of children born of consensual sex. States having imprecise
parentage laws should facilitate later judicial inquiries into earlier parental-

78 See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 490 n.1, 500 (N.Y. 2016)
(holding that where unwed same-sex female couple agreed to conceive and raise a child
together, nonbiological, nonadoptive partner can be a childcare parent over birth mother’s
objection; in the case, these was no written agreement or formal declaration of intent, and
the facts involving alleged oral agreements and understandings about childcare were
disputed).
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like acts by establishing new mechanisms for formal declarations of
assumed and intended parentage. Such declarations would not control
courts making childcare parentage determinations. Rather, they would
guide, helping courts apply their states’ imprecise childcare parentage laws
that depend upon earlier actions and intentions of parents and nonparents
regarding the continuing or future care and support of children. New state
mechanisms for formal declarations of assumed and intended childcare
parentage should be developed after imprecise childcare parent laws are
established through statutes or court decisions. Such laws can demand
respect for premarital or mid-marriage childcare pacts dealing, for example,
with assumed and intended stepparent childcare, as well as for cohabitation
pacts between single parents and their significant others.

